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THE PLACE OF CORPORATE
LAWMAKING IN AMERICAN SOCIETY
Fenner Stewart, Jr.*
I. Introduction
he concept of “embeddedness” can be traced to Karl
Polanyi’s The Great Transformation.1 The book is a history
of the commoditization of English society from the eighteenth
century forward, recounting how markets became unstitched
from the fabric of society. As markets became more distinct from
everyday life, society began to change in order to meet trending
economic needs. One example of this transformation was the
enclosure of English farmlands and the end of the ancient system
of farming on land that was considered free for the use of all.
This created a radical disruption in social function. Without
farmland, thousands were forced to move to sites of industrial
production, generating a radical shift in society from traditional
agrarian life to one that was dominated by factory work. In other
words, Polanyi’s book explains how markets became
disembedded from society and then how these disembedded
markets altered social activities as they became re-embedded into
market function.2
Polanyi never believed that society could become
completely embedded within the market function, concluding
that society’s members would never tolerate a market function
which completely overwhelmed their social needs. This resistance

T

* B.A., University of Prince Edward Island; LL.B. & LL.M., University of
British Columbia; Ph.D. Candidate & Adjunct Professor, York University
Osgoode Hall Law School; Academic Director 2009-2010, CLPE Comparative
Research
in
Law
&
Political
Economy
Network
(www.comparativeresearch.net). I am grateful to Peer Zumbansen and
Cynthia Williams for their comments on this paper, and also to Stephen
Bainbridge and Mark Roe for their comments on an earlier version.
1
KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (2d ed. 2001).
2
Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem
of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOC. 481, 482 (1985).
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to market pressures is what Polanyi called the “double
movement.”3 Simon Deakin has elaborated on Polanyi’s idea of
the double movement, explaining how it also operates in reverse.4
In other words, market actors will resist projects for greater
equality when these social demands compromise market
functionality. The balance between favoring the needs of markets
with the needs of society has fluctuated throughout the twentieth
century.5 According to Deakin, the pendulum is swinging toward
the modern economy’s increased need for markets as societal
governance has become ever more closely tied to the expectations
of investors.6 Today, certainly, the pendulum appears to be
swinging in a different yet still unknown direction.7
In his seminal article of 1985, Mark Granovetter
elaborated upon Polanyi’s disembedded market theory and
expanded it into a more complete (and complex) sociological
theory of how embedded social behavior affects economic
institutions.8 Granovetter argued that to adequately study
economic institutions, like corporations, one must take into
consideration how the behavior of such institutions is
“constrained by ongoing social relations.”9 Granovetter’s
central contention was that when economic reasoning ignores an
institution’s social embeddedness, such reasoning is blinded to
the actual social relationships within it and, accordingly, it is
unlikely one will be able to understand how a particular
institution functions (or fails to function).10
Granovetter’s call to scrutinize the social relationships
that affect an organization’s function has been seen as a
sociological plea explaining why institutions behave as they do.
He criticized the assumptions of New Institutional Economics by
highlighting how actual social networks inside and outside of the
corporation operate in ways that handcuff economic thought.
3

For a detailed commentary on the double movement, see Fred Block,
Introduction to POLANYI, supra note 1, at xxiii-xxvii.
4
Simon Deakin, The Rise of Finance: What Is It, What Is Driving It,
What Might Stop It? A Comment on “Finance and Labor: Perspectives on
Risk, Inequality and Democracy” by Sanford Jacoby, 30 COMP. LAB. L. &
POL’Y 67, 67-69 (2008).
5
Block, supra note 3, at xxvii - xxvix.
6
See Deakin, supra note 4, at 67-68.
7
See Lawrence Mitchell, Financialism: A Lecture Delivered at Creighton
University School of Law, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 323 (2009).
8
Granovetter, supra note 2.
9
Id. at 482.
10
Id. at 481-82.
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Specifically, Granovetter took issue with Oliver Williamson’s
theory of transaction costs, arguing that while there was a certain
analytical value to Williamson’s eventually highly influential
market/hierarchy model of the corporation,11 it remained blind to
the social reality of corporate function.12
Up until now, Granovetter has served as something of a
connector between Polanyi’s efforts and current ongoing
investigations into the concept of embeddedness.13 Certainly, the
new interest in economic sociology and its relevance in bridging
discourses in sociology, legal theory, and political economy14
contributes to a better understanding of the merits and
boundaries of “economic governance;”15 something of
particular importance at a time of fundamental readjustments to
the financial credo of the last two decades.
Legal theory itself reflects the early beginnings of such
critical engagement with an exclusively economistic bias. John
Dewey, in a famous inquiry into the law’s constitution of the
corporation,16 identified the law as a powerful tool with the
ability to take an abstract idea (such as the suggestion that the
corporation was a “person”) and transform it into something
more concrete and real (by, for example, granting a corporation
the right to contract or equipping it with constitutional
protections). Such legal reification, according to Dewey, shapes
how people think about a corporation. As a consequence, this
reification also shapes people’s behavior within, and in relation
to, corporations.
An important strand in studies on embeddedness and
11

See Oliver E. Williamson, The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution,
Attributes, 19 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1537 (1981); Oliver E. Williamson, The
New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead, 38 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 595 (2000); Peer Zumbansen & Gralf-Peter Calliess, Law,
Economics and Evolutionary Theory: State of the Art and Interdisciplinary
Perspectives, Osgoode Hall L. Sch. Comp. Res. in L. & Pol. Econ. Res. Paper
Series, Paper No. 10/2010, 2010, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1595158.
12
Granovetter, supra note 2, at 493-504.
13
Jens Beckert, The Great Transformation of Embeddedness. Karl Polanyi
and the New Economic Sociology (Max Planck Inst. for the Study of Societies,
Discussion Paper No. 07/1, 2007).
14
Jens Beckert & Wolfgang Streeck, Economic Sociology and Political
Economy. A Programmatic Perspective (Max Planck Inst. for the Study of
Societies, Working Paper 08/4, 2008).
15
Zumbansen & Calliess, supra note 11.
16
John Dewey, The Historical Background of Corporate Legal Personality,
35 YALE L. J. 655 (1926).
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comparative variations in national political economies around the
world has been to focus on different forms of market
organization.17 Central to such inquiries has been the analysis of
the particular dynamics of reform politics that often emerged
against the background of historically evolved pathdependencies.18 Similarly, sociologists have long focused on sites
where law is produced as “sites of contestation” between
influential groups attempting to maintain or change the
embedded patterns of social relationships. In Competition as a
Cultural Phenomenon, Karl Mannheim detailed how preferences
become entrenched or embedded within society through social
processes like lawmaking and, in particular, through the
competitive actions between influential social groups within these
social processes.19 From this perspective, Mannheim can be seen
as providing a promising approach for connecting Polanyi’s and
Granovetter’s ideas of embeddedness with Dewey’s
understanding of the legal reification of business ideas. Building
upon this connection of ideas, Mannheim’s article explores one of
the most important sites of contestation between influential
business groups; namely, the place that has historically
triumphed in attracting the highest number of Fortune 500
business incorporation in America: Delaware – America’s
regulatory laboratory for de facto “national” corporate law.
The social process of how preferences become entrenched
or embedded within American corporate charters is of particular
importance to understanding such behavior within the American
corporation. If Dewey was correct and the law shapes the
behavior of actors within the business world, then the corporate
charter is a central tool in this process. The corporate charter is
the foundational contract of the corporation, establishing the
distribution of wealth and power between its members and others
outside of the corporate organization. In other words, it is a
contract which formalizes social relations between the
constituents of a corporation. Although the charter does not
dictate all social relations within the corporation, it does set a
17
VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001).
18
John W. Cioffi, Restructuring "Germany Inc.": The Politics of Corporate
Governance Reform in Germany and the European Union, 24 L. & POL'Y 355
(2002).
19
KARL MANNHEIM, ESSAYS ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 197-98
(Paul Kecskemeti ed., 1952).
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standard for expectations for social relations and is highly
influential in the embedding process.
This Note provides a history of the legal debates over
corporate charters in the American context beginning with a
famous dispute that originated in a series of contesting law
review articles in the 1970s. A brief literature review will recount
the academic arguments that have provided the intellectual
support for sustaining Delaware’s primacy over corporate
lawmaking in the face of constant attack. By understanding the
debates that have sustained Delaware’s ability to lead the
American competition for incorporation, this Note provides
insight into what is regarded as the most important legal
instrument for maintaining status quo for actual social
relationships within the American corporation: the “market for
incorporation.”
However, this Note will also draw attention to the
growing skepticism over Delaware’s ability to consistently
legislate optimal corporate law. This skepticism is most clearly
evident in the federal government’s growing willingness to design
and to pursue corporate law policies in the face of corporate
governance scandal, notwithstanding the fact that corporate law
in the United States is governed by the states. The consequences
of these developments are subject to strict scrutiny and ongoing
discussion. In sum, this Note provides an example of how shifts
in lawmaking networks outside of the firm demand the potential
to shift the embeddedness of the behavior of social relationships
inside the firm.
II. Historical Introduction
During the American republic’s early decades, state
legislatures restricted the rights of corporate action by
scrutinizing petitions for incorporation just as they would any
other piece of legislation.20 In theory, democratic representatives
granted incorporation only if it served the public interest, but
healthy skepticism should be reserved for anyone who claims that
this was always the case.21 Restrictions on the corporation were
20

For the boundaries of government’s authority over incorporation,
especially after the corporate charter was issued by the state, see Trustees of
Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819). For greater detail, see
David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L. J. 201, 206-10 (1990).
21
DAVID SCIULLI, CORPORATIONS VS. THE COURTS: PRIVATE POWER,
PUBLIC INTERESTS 85 (1999) (arguing that each request for incorporation was
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severe by today’s standards; for instance: 1) a corporation could
not accumulate more than a set amount of capital;22 2) a
corporation’s life was usually fixed to the time required to finish
the task(s) that it was incorporated to accomplish;23 3) a
corporation could not engage in activities that were not explicitly
defined in the terms of its incorporation;24 and 4) a corporation’s
business activities could not extend beyond the boundaries of the
state in which it was incorporated.25
Yet in spite of such limitations, the corporation was still a
coveted investment vehicle. One reason for this was that the
status of shareholders was a rare and prestigious privilege.26
However, it would be misleading to conclude that this investment
vehicle was desired merely because it offered a degree of social
status. The main attraction to the corporation was more likely the
limited liability protection it offered to businessmen27 and the
opportunities for power and profits which large “public
interest” projects presented.28
By 1858, Americans had endured a depression, multiple
stock market crashes, and witnessed what was perceived to be
the floundering public management of large interstate canal
projects. These events provoked a profound shift of public
opinion regarding the relationship between public and private
subject to the same lobbying and debate as any other bill, including “power
plays, personal intrigues and local favoritism”).
22
For a thorough collection of references to specific legislation from the
19th century, see Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 550-54 (1933) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
23
Id. at 555.
24
Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 588 (1839) (Taney, CJ, held that
since the powers conferred on the corporation can be no greater than state
power, which granted the incorporation, the firm had no authority to operate
outside the state).
25
Id.
26
JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS
CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970 14, 25, 28
(1970).
27
Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Developments of
Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 208-09 (1985) (arguing that although
the common law had evolved to the point of presuming limited liability, state
legislatures enacted legislation to extend their shareholder liability a bit further
than the value of their share).
28
Millon, supra note 20, at 207 (arguing that there was fear that the
potential for power and wealth associated with incorporation caused
Americans to fear that such organizations could threaten the opportunity of
others to enter the market; adding that, as a result, governments rarely confer
monopoly privileges).

Stewart Article.doc (Do Not Delete)

12/29/2010 1:10:04 PM

2010] Place of Corporate Lawmaking in American Society

153

power in American society.29 People began viewing government
intervention in private transactions less as a means of securing
liberty and more in terms of restricting it. Public authorities
found themselves faced with a public that demanded justification
for why the corporation must be a servant of public interest and,
more importantly from the individual’s perspective, why private
citizens should not use such corporations solely for personal
advantage in the pursuit of happiness.30 Citizens also became less
trusting of government discretion in granting incorporations
because accusations of favoritism and corruption became
widespread.31 With these adverse changes in public opinion, the
government walls that confined corporate behavior began to
crumble. Emerging state policy began to challenge the longestablished understanding that the function of the corporation
was solely to serve the community.32 This shift, in turn, opened
the door for the considerably activist U.S. Supreme Court to
determine that corporations had constitutional rights, protecting
corporations from the threat of public meddling in their affairs.33
With the loosening of state policy and advancements in
technology, the number of incorporations increased
exponentially. Professional management teams, in turn, were
hired more frequently as majority shareholders became less
commonly involved in the corporation’s day-to-day

29
For more on how the canals fiasco shifted public opinion, see CARTER
GOODRICH, GOVERNMENT PROMOTION OF AMERICAN CANALS AND
RAILWAY (1961); see also CARTER GOODRICH, JULIUS RUBIN, JEROME
CRANMER, AND HARVEY H. SEGAL, CANALS AND AMERICAN ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 241, 246-47 (1961) (describing what was perceived to be the
costly financial failures of the nineteenth century canal projects, of which
almost 3/4 of the $188 million invested between 1815 and 1860 came from the
public purse). For more on how the other mentioned financial crisis affected
public opinion, see WILLIAM G. ROY, SOCIALIZING CAPITAL: THE RISE OF
THE LARGE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION IN AMERICA 71-75 (1997).
30
SCIULLI, supra note 21, at 89.
31
HURST, supra note 26, at 33-36, 136.
32
Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the Business Corporation in
American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441, 1447 (1987) (arguing that changes in
state law incorporation policies “eliminated any notion that incorporation
was a special grant from the state, even the public nature of a corporation’s
purpose could be called into doubt”).
33
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886). For a
detailed understanding of the case and a detailed argument regarding the
fallout from this case in America, see Horwitz, supra note 27. For a contrasting
point of view, see Millon, supra note 20.
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management.34 These radical transformations created a flood of
new and complex issues into state courts – necessitating the call
for legal clarity.35 This inspired the creation of specific state
judiciaries to oversee corporate practice.36 Willing jurisdictions
(in particular, New Jersey and Delaware) customized regulatory
environments to attract those businessmen shopping for the most
advantageous jurisdiction to incorporate their businesses.37 Such
states also began to adopt new management-friendly legislation,
mostly because the franchise taxes, fee revenues, and taxation on
extra business opportunities (which followed incorporation) filled
state coffers.38
Beginning in the mid-1800s, a gradual loosening of
government policy occurred. For example, in 1846, New York
started a trend in state reform which blocked the legislature from
creating corporations by special act, except in the rare case where
the objectives for devising the corporation could not be attained
under general law.39 In addition, in 1867, the U.S. Congress
expanded bankruptcy protections to include corporations.40
Further, in 1875, New Jersey eliminated the restrictions on the
corporation’s ability to accumulate capital.41 In 1886, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the private corporation was a “natural
person” under the U.S. Constitution, therefore protected by the
Bill of Rights, which broadly protected the corporations from
public authority.42 New Jersey offered the first standard articles

34

SCIULLI, supra note 21, at 90.
HURST , supra note 26, at 82-83.
36
Id.
37
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and The Corporation: The Desirable
Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1443
(1992) (describing the pressures and incentives, which started jurisdiction
competition for incorporation); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate
Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L. J. 663, 669-70 (1974) (arguing
that state competition has lead to a “a race for the bottom” in terms of the
standards for corporate governance – in particular to the disadvantage of
shareholders).
38
Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History
and Agency, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 885, 888 (1990); Cary, supra note 37, at 66869; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of Corporate Federalism: State Competition
and the New Trend Toward De Facto Federal Minimum Standards, 8
CARDOZO L. REV. 759, 762 (1987).
39
N.Y. CONST. OF 1846, art. VIII, § 1.
40
SCIULLI, supra note 21, at 91.
41
Id.
42
Horwitz, supra note 27; see also Millon, supra note 20.
35
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of incorporation for private businesses in 1888.43 In one reflexive
jerk away from the growing power of the mighty corporation, the
Sherman Antitrust Act was signed in 1890.44 But still racing
forward at the state level, in 1896, New Jersey adopted what
could be recognized as the first modern corporate statutes and,
thus, it became the home to the majority of America’s largest
corporations (a title that Delaware would steal within twenty
years).45 In 1910, the Supreme Court nullified restrictions on
corporate capacity to conduct business outside the states in which
it was chartered.46 By 1933, Mr. Justice Brandeis, reflecting on
this historical trend toward state competition in corporate law in
Liggett Co. v. Lee,47 expressed concern over how the fear of losing
existing state revenue and the allure of earning greater state
revenue was eroding the diligent construction of corporate legal
development by replacing it with a permissive consumer product
that pandered to powerful corporate interests.
III. The First Wave: Drawing the Distinction
In one of the most influential articles ever published by
the Yale Law Journal,48 William Cary reconsidered the trends in
federalism and corporate law from the nineteenth century
forward and declared that modern state corporate law was a
product of state competition. Most importantly, states were
legislatively competing to attract incorporation to increase state
revenues, creating a dangerous “race-to-the-bottom” for
corporate governance standards.49 Cary’s focus quickly turned to
the by-then leader of this race, Delaware. He opined that
Delaware’s motivation for its considerably softened stance on
corporate governance standards was motivated by the state’s
budget dependence on revenues from incorporations, therefore
creating an inversely indebted relationship between the state and
those corporate managers looking to incorporate. This compelled
Delaware to offer advantageous corporate legal arrangements
that allowed managers broad and unchecked authority; therefore,
43

ROY, supra note 29, at 152-53.
Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1–7 (2006).
45
Bebchuk , supra note 37, at 1443.
46
Millon, supra note 20, at 212-13.
47
288 U.S. 517, 557 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
48
It was called the most influential piece ever published by the Yale Law
Journal, see Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Articles from the Yale Law
Journal, 100 YALE L. J. 1449 (1991).
49
Cary, supra note 37, at 666.
44
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corporations were no longer faced with the disincentive required
to curb less-than-optimal corporate performance.50 Cary argued
that it was time for the federal government and the judiciary to
“import lifting standards” that would set a level beyond which
corporate standards would not be allowed to fall below and
“deteriorate.”51
Three years later, in 1977, Ralph K. Winter wrote a reply
to Cary’s position which by this time had almost universally
become endorsed as a matter of fact. In the face of this general
consensus, Winter boldly rejected Cary’s position arguing that
state competition should “tend toward optimality so far as the
shareholders’ relationship to the corporation is concerned” and
thus corporate governance standards, like those of Delaware,
“are optimal legal arrangements.”52 Put differently, what Cary
regarded as a “race-to-the-bottom” Winter replaced as a
“race-to-the-top.”
Borrowing from the ideas of Henry Manne,53 Oliver
Williamson,54 and Armen A. Alchian,55 Winter constructed an
argument which suggested that because corporations acquired
capital by selling bonds and equity, management was therefore
forced to weigh the interests of such financial actors and
instruments.56 Winter posited that “the state which ‘rigs’ its
code to benefit management will drive debt and equity capital
away.”57 Furthermore, he argued that, although Cary was
correct in assessing that managers ultimately had the consumer
50

Id. at 668-69.
Id. at 705.
52
Ralph K. Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of
the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 254 (1977).
53
See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73
J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965); see also Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation
Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259 (1967).
54
Oliver Williamson, Corporate Control and the Theory of the Firm, in
THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 281 (Henry G. Manne ed.,
1969).
55
Armen A. Alchian & Reuben A. Kessel, Competition, Monopoly, and the
Pursuit of Pecuniary Gain, in ASPECTS OF LABOR ECONOMICS 156 (National
Bureau
of
Economic
Research
ed.,
1962)
available
at
http://www.nber.org.flagship.luc.edu/chapters/c0605.pdf; see also Armen A.
Alchian, Corporate Management and Property Rights, in ECONOMIC POLICY
AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES (Henry G. Manne ed.,
1969); see also Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information
Cost and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972).
56
Winter, supra note 52, at 289.
57
Id.
51
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power to decide which jurisdiction to incorporate, managers
would not select a jurisdiction that would cause their business to:
1) earn lower-than-normal returns; and/or 2) have a higher cost of
capital.58 On the contrary, managers would select jurisdictions
that afforded the opposite for the sake of self-preservation. Thus,
state competition, also known as the charter market, produced an
optimal corporate law regime which accurately reflected the
demands that corporate constituents had for corporate
governance.59
The rationale for the charter market that causes the raceto-the-top can be restated as follows: If the corporate legal regime
is structured so that management cannot maximize the corporate
output (profits), debt holders may make it more expensive to: 1)
hold debt; and 2) raise new debt.60 This corporate legal regime
will also depress stock price potential thereby making it more
expensive to raise new capital as well as maintain optimal
relations with shareholders and creditors. Such underperforming
firms will become targets for takeover, and the threat of takeover
will create a market for managerial control.61 Thus, managers
will have ample incentive to demand an off-the-rack default
statutory model of corporate governance that encourages
shareholder maximization.62 Since such a default model can be
assumed to be what managers are shopping for when they select a
jurisdiction to incorporate, this is what state competition will
foster.63 Thus, the charter market creates a race-to-the-top.
Furthermore, it creates a system of legal innovation that is not
compromised by political interference – which would ultimately
be the result of Cary’s recommendation for federal government
intervention.
With the two sides of the Cary/Winter debate delineated,
the stage seemed set for the next three decades with the advocates
of Cary’s position representing: 1) anti-managerialism; 2) federal
intervention in state competition; and 3) more centralized
planning, and the advocates of Winter’s position representing: 1)
managerialism; 2) unfettered state competition; and 3) more
decentralized market rationality.64 Underpinning both positions
58

Id.
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 290.
63
Id.
64
For more analysis on Winter’s theory, see Roberta Romano, Law as a
Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 225
59
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was an understanding that the firm was a distinct market actor
that focused squarely upon finding an optimal solution to the
shareholder-management problem.
IV. The Second Wave: Event Studies and the Attempts to Settle
the Cary-Winter Debate
Winter’s economic analysis of charter markets forced Cary
proponents to adjust their arguments by taking a more
economically sophisticated position. Following Winter’s lead,
they employed more economically savvy arguments to suggest
that shareholders (and creditors) had much less control over
managers’ incorporation preferences in practice than Winter’s
charter market theory suggested and, thus, the race-to-the-top
argument was flawed.65 In response, others became inspired to
settle this theoretical tit-for-tat debate by engaging in empirical
research in the form of “event studies.”66 These studies
established that many stocks affected by the amendments rose in
value when the markets learned of the amendments, thereby
bolstering Winter’s position that state competition was
advantageous for shareholders.
Those defending Cary’s position fired back. Melvin
Eisenberg rejected these event studies, arguing that they had
“only limited usefulness” in the context of the Cary-Winter
(1985) [hereinafter Romano, Law as a Product]; ROBERTA ROMANO, THE
GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The
Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law, REGULATION 26 (Spring 2003); Leo
E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to
Bebchuk's Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV.
1759, 1775 (2006); STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2008). For representatives from the
Cary camp, see Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1508 (1989); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell,
Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers,
99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1170 (1999); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf
Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition
over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L. J. 553 (2002) [hereinafter Bebchuk &
Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk]; Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case
for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005).
65
Eisenberg, supra note 64.
66
Event studies were simply empirical tests which gauged market
responses to corporate law amendments. See generally Peter Dodd & Richard
Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: ‘Unhealthy Competition’ vs.
Federal Regulation, 53 J. BUS. 259 (1980); Romano, Law as a Product, supra
note 64; Jeffry Netter & Annette Poulsen, State Corporation Laws and
Shareholders: The Recent Experience, 18 FIN. MGMT. 29 (1989).
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debate.67 Specifically, Eisenberg contended that if a uniformly
low-grade corporate law regime existed – as Cary seemed to
suggest – then the notice of an amendment from “one low-grade
regime to another would not be a significant event.”68 He also
suggested that Delaware’s mature case law increased
predictability, which helped to countervail potentially suboptimal
rules and amendments. More importantly, Eisenberg emphasized
that other contributory factors may have skewed the results of the
event studies.69 One example of such factors included packaging
negative amendments to existing law with positive ones.70
Eisenberg suggested that such event studies were limited because
the economic analysis was so superficial that it could not
adequately appreciate the complexity of the American “charter
market.”71 Lucian Bebchuk made similar arguments that
suggested how negative information can be packaged with
positive information in order to maintain or improve stock value,
while also re-emphasizing that Cary’s position was still correct.72
Within four years of Eisenberg’s reply, Roberta Romano
published what would become the landmark statement in
support of Winter.73 Aimed at responding to Eisenberg’s demand
for “deeper economic analysis,”74 Romano employed the lenses
of: 1) financial risk management within equity markets; 2) agency
cost theory; and 3) the relational understanding between sociolegal norms and market forces, which - taken together - helped to
better understand the mechanics of the charter market. In the
end, this deeper economic analysis led both Eisenberg and
Romano closer to a centrist position, with Eisenberg leaning
toward Cary’s position75 and Romano toward Winter’s.76

67

Eisenberg, supra note 64, at 1508.
Id.
69
Eisenburg posited that such contributing factors were not taken into
consideration during the event studies. Id.
70
Id.
71
Id at 1509.
72
Lucian Bebchuk, Federalism and The Corporation: The Desirable Limits
on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1992).
73
ROMANO, supra note 64.
74
See Eisenberg, supra note 64 (Eisenberg uses this language to level his
criticism of the superficial nature of the event studies).
75
Id. at 1509.
76
ROMANO, supra note 64, at 148.
68
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V. The Third Wave: Post-Enron
Alas, the debate was not dead. Lucian Bebchuk took
Cary’s side and warned that state competition encouraged a raceto-the-bottom given the states’ obvious inclination to make rules
attractive to managers and controllers.77 In 1999, Bebchuk and
Allen Ferrell illustrated how anti-takeover statutes were
inefficient and reduced shareholder wealth,78 and illustrated one
clear example of how states provided default rules that benefited
only managers to the detriment of all other constituents, and
“should lead the many who offer unqualified support of state
competition to reassess their position.”79 But in 1999, the U.S.
economy was hot, the inflation-adjusted aggregate output was
up, real gross domestic product was up, corporate profits were
up, employment was up, and everyone was making money.
Bebchuk’s concerns were inaudible over the sound of investors’
portfolios filling with money. Corporate America seemed to be
anything but broken.
All that changed in 2001 when the Enron Scandal
outraged Americans and pulled corporate governance under the
microscope.80 In step with this change in climate, Bebchuk
reiterated his position that the empirical evidence supported the
view that state competition offered harmful incentives, which
privileged managers to the detriment of all other corporate
constituents.81 Building on this critique, Bebchuk went on to
argue that Delaware’s position in the charter market was so
strong that assumptions about the operation of state competition
were false. In other words, Delaware was more sheltered from the
influence of other states’ actions than was assumed in the
literature, producing suboptimal corporate rules and justifying
federal intervention.82
In the summer of 2002, the federal government induced
aggressive measures to appease populist reactions to the Enron
scandal. Suddenly, there was a rash movement toward Cary’s
federal intervention that may have been procedurally pleasing to
some corporate governance observers, but was ultimately
77

Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 64.
Id.
79
Id. at 1199.
80
See William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder
Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275 (2002).
81
See Lucian Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition
in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775 (2002).
82
Bebchuk & Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk, supra note 64.
78
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substantively disappointing to most. With this came renewed
interest in the Cary-Winter debate.
In this vein, Mark Roe set out to offer some fresh insight
building on Bebchuk’s suggestion that Delaware was in fact
insulated from state competition, not its catalyst.83 Roe concluded
that the nature of corporate regulatory competition had been
“misconceived – and badly so,” arguing that Delaware’s chief
competition was never other states but, instead, the federal
government.84 Other states did not have the constitutional
authority to trump Delaware’s default rules for corporate
governance, but the federal government did. In other words,
Delaware’s incorporation regime existed because the federal
government tolerated it. Accordingly, the results of corporate law
evolution may have been due in part to state competition, but the
ever-looming threat of federal intervention was also a major
factor. Which of these two factors affected the evolution of
corporate law was difficult to determine because the world of
Delaware policymaking was opaque.
Roe further suggested that if the competition between
Delaware and the federal government was considered when
attempting to understand the traditionally conceived mechanism
of state competition, the state race debate did not play out the
way charter market analysis had been assuming all along.85 He
suggested that a new theory was necessary to explain how policy
networks forged American corporate law, arguing that top-down
“centralized strategic” planning had as much responsibility for
corporate law outcomes as did lateral state competition.86 This
would give support to the idea that the federal political
dimension compromises the narrow quest for solely
understanding state competition through the assumed model of
charter markets as constructed during the second wave of the
debate.
In 2003, one year after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(“SOX”), Stephen Bainbridge took a polarizing position as far
to the Winter end of the continuum as Bebchuk had taken to
Cary’s.87 Bainbridge blasted the federalization of corporate law,
calling the actions of Congress and other regulators “deeply

83

Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003).
Id. at 591.
85
Id. at 646
86
Id.
87
Bainbridge, supra note 64.
84
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flawed.”88 He argued that, since the Enron scandal, the actions
of the federal government represented “the most dramatic
expansion of federal regulatory power over corporate governance
since the New Deal.”89 Rejecting the federal reforms as an
unnecessary encroachment on state jurisdiction, Bainbridge
pointed to Romano’s event study in support of his claim that
state competition, and Delaware’s default rules, favored
shareholders by maximizing shareholder wealth.90 When
addressing Bebchuk’s 1999 argument about the negative effects
of state competition upon shareholder wealth by legislating antitakeover statutes, his response was “so what . . . nobody claims
that state competition is perfect.”91 He also proclaimed that
“even if Bebchuk could prove that state competition is a race-tothe-bottom, basic principles of federalism would still counsel
against federal preemption of corporate law,” because the
potential for regulatory innovation would be seriously
compromised.92
In 2005, Roe reemphasized that American scholars ought
to recognize that the presumptions on state competition were
skewing their perception, arguing that instead of looking at the
results of horizontal state competition, observers needed to
understand when the federal government decided to leave such
authority in the hands of the states and when it decided to claw
back such authority for itself.93 Instead of Delaware being the
product of market pressures, Roe viewed Delaware as a political
group with a narrowly-defined range of concerns within the
larger policy network of corporate law development.94 In this
light, Delaware’s policymaking network was like a caucus of
managers and investors. And within this caucus, Roe deemed
that managers clearly had the “upper hand” in guiding policy
development, but these same managers also appeared to exercise
self-restraint because they understood “the game could move to
Washington” if the scales were pushed too far toward
managerialism.95
Also in 2005, Leo E. Strine, Jr., Vice Chancellor of
88

Id. at 26.
Id.
90
Id. at 30.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2494 (2005).
94
Id.
95
Id. at 2542.
89
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Delaware’s Court of Chancery, set out to “take some of the
mystery out of Delaware’s role in the governance of American
public corporations.”96 When discussing the politics of state
competition, however, Strine was noticeably reserved. He alluded
to the fact that Delaware was and will be in the lead for some
time to come in the state race for corporate law.97 In defining the
boundaries of state competition, he stated that the issues of
competition, labor, trade, and disclosures to public investors were
generally regulated federally, while Delaware governed the
“internal affairs of the corporation.”98 He never more than
tacitly acknowledged that the federal government had full
authority to regulate in this area as well.99 In other words, Strine
failed to directly acknowledge that Delaware’s power was a
privilege granted to the state by the federal government and not a
constitutional right. Accordingly, Strine does not elaborate on this
federal power other than to say that present interventions like
SOX and the amendments to listing requirements were
suboptimal reforms.
In an exchange in the Harvard Law Review, the issue of
federal intervention in the Delaware caucus was raised once
again. Bebchuk argued that managers were too powerful and
were blocking shareholders from maximizing shareholder
value.100 Accordingly, he asserted that, since managers dominated
state law, the federal government had to intervene.101 In response,
Strine entertained Bebchuk’s proposal,102 but emphasized that
such reform “must emanate from state policymakers;”103
Delaware (and not the federal government) ought to be “the
primary source of substantive corporate law” reform.104
Bainbridge, in his response to Bebchuk, did not exhibit any of the
potential flexibility that Strine did. He flatly rejected Bebchuk’s
call for greater shareholder empowerment by arguing that if
Bebchuk’s proposal could really enhance the value of the firm,
why did it not already exist? In challenging Bebchuk in this
96

Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and
Some of the New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673
(2005).
97
Id. at 673-74.
98
Id. at 674.
99
Id. at 686
100
Bebchuk, supra note 64.
101
Id. at 874.
102
Strine, supra note 64, at 1775.
103
Id. at 1777.
104
Id. at 1780.
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manner, Bainbridge employed a classic Winteresque race-to-thetop argument.105 Bainbridge rejected any changes to Delaware’s
law and lawmaking capacity.
In reply, Bebchuk was somewhat encouraged by Strine’s
opinions (although he believed they did not extend far enough).106
Bebchuk attacked Bainbridge’s race-to-the-top argument by
referencing a Winteresque argument from 1983, which advocated
against federal intervention to better regulate insider trading. The
1983 article argued there was nothing wrong with the existing
standards since charter competition would have already corrected
them if they were suboptimal. This example illustrated the error
of assuming that state competition already provided optimal
corporate governance arrangements as Bainbridge suggested.107
In an interesting twist, Bebchuk pointed out that the innovative
nature of state competition implied state law was subject to
improvement in an evolving context.108 Thus, even if one
assumed Delaware produced optimal corporate law, it did not
mean his proposition ought to be rejected outright.
The recent Bebchuk/Strine/Bainbridge debate helps to
confirm Roe’s observation that the true motivator for corporate
governance innovation is the threat of federal intervention.
Bebchuk’s call for such intervention caused a defense of
Delaware from both Strine and Bainbridge, and also a
willingness on Strine’s part to seriously entertain various
shareholder empowerment initiatives. This reflects what is at
stake in these debates over Delaware: the spectrum of embedded
relationships between public and private power in American
society.
VI. What Place Does Delaware Reserve for the Corporation in
American Society? A Reflection of Bainbridge
A. The Delaware Status Quo
Delaware attempts to enshrine managerialism within
American corporate governance. Delaware’s historic trump card
105

Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1737-42 (2006) [hereinafter
Bainbridge 2006].
106
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Reply: Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1784, 1796 (2006).
107
Id. at 1805.
108
Id. at 1808.
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is the race-to-the-top argument,109 but recent history challenges
whether favoring managerialism is the optimal strategy for
regulating the corporation. Amidst corporate scandal and
economic downturns over the past decade, managerialism has
garnered much scrutiny and created agency issues. The solutions
for these agency relationship problems, which were inspired by
the work of Michael Jensen and William Meckling,110 appear
insufficient to cope with managerial opportunism as well as
responsible risk management.
This section explores the writing of one of Delaware’s
most loyal defenders: Stephen Bainbridge. Bainbridge defends
Delaware while simultaneously distancing himself from
managerialism. Bainbridge claims that American directors are
undergoing a transformation, becoming more than de facto
rubber stamps for managerial power.111 He has developed a
theory he calls “director primacy,” which re-invents the
managerialist position in a way that can appeal to both
managerialists and anti-managerialists.112 By taking the
shareholder/manager dichotomy and splitting it into a
shareholder/director/manager trichotomy, Bainbridge places
corporate directors firmly in the middle of the struggle between
ownership and control. The brilliance of this position is that it
personifies what Delaware’s corporate law has de jure attempted
to enforce since the rise of the modern corporation. The weakness
in Bainbridge’s argument, however, is that history proves that
American directors have not always lived up to the model of
corporate governance.
If American directors are becoming more loyal to
shareholder concerns, then director primacy is the driving force
in a coup d’état in American corporate governance. However,
those skeptical of Bainbridge will argue that this shift is not
occurring and that his director primacy argument is no more than
managerialism with a twist, albeit a clever twist that distances his
position from the criticism of managerialism, while still
sustaining the status quo in American corporate governance. And
to a degree this criticism is fair – the ends of Bainbridge’s director
primacy position are still the same as those of managerialism in
109

BAINBRIDGE, supra note 64, at 98-99, 103-04, 192-94, 200, 233.
See Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 2 J. FIN. ECON.
305 (1976).
111
See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 64.
112
Id.
110
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one important respect: both empower managers, at least until
such time as the boards of America’s large public corporations
start behaving in the manner that Bainbridge projects they will.
Even with federal initiatives to bolster director
independence,
Bainbridge
himself
acknowledges
the
Panoglossian nature of being optimistic about the present
potential for director primacy. For example, he fully recognizes
the problem of directors side-stepping their accountability to
important constituents, such as shareholders.113 And yet, just
under the surface of American corporate law (which has always
enshrined director primacy in a “wink-wink, nudge-nudge”
sort of a way) may be another managerial revolution114 which will
blur the classic distinctions between shareholder/manager and
managerialist/anti-managerialist by encouraging the board of
directors to take their duties more seriously. The director primacy
norms may cause directors to start standing up to the special
interests of managers and protecting shareholder interests more
diligently. As a result, this may foster a better relationship
between ownership and control and help resolve some of the
serious agency issues that exist today.
B. Bainbridge’s Director Primacy
The necessary shift in corporate governance, which can
make director primacy transcend from theory into business
reality and become the dominant model, will occur when boards
of directors become more than mere rubber stamps for CEOs and
other top executives. Bainbridge claims that this shift has
commenced, arguing that directors are finally about to seize the
mantle of power that corporate law has for so long reserved for
itself.115 However, until this time, directors have rarely been
113

Id. at 98-99, 103-04, 192-94, 200, 233.
The first Managerialist revolution occurred with the contractarian shift
to “the Market” in the 1970s, which resulted in managers shifting their focus
away from balancing the constituent interests of the firm and towards
maximizing shareholder value. For an explanation of the evolution of
corporate governance by dividing it into historical paradigms, see Peer
Zumbansen, The Evolution of the Corporation: Organization, Finance,
Knowledge and Corporate Social Responsibility, CLPE Research Paper No.
6/2009 (2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1346971.
115
See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 64. For examples of the development of
director primacy, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus
of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2002) (this is an introduction to the
conceptual foundation for his theory of director primacy) [hereinafter
114

Stewart Article.doc (Do Not Delete)

12/29/2010 1:10:04 PM

2010] Place of Corporate Lawmaking in American Society

167

separated from “managers” in the managerialist forum, and for
good reason since directors are rarely distinguishable from
corporate executives in their decision making choices.116 For this
reason, beneath Bainbridge’s director primacy lays a contentious
theory that a functional revolution is occurring in American
corporate governance. This functional revolution may or may not
be happening and is difficult to substantiate, but if Bainbridge is
correct, then director primacy will mark a historic shift in
governance away from Chandler’s model of managerialism
(which has dominated corporate thinking throughout the
twentieth century) toward the board-centered fiat model, which
director primacy endorses.
In promoting director primacy, Bainbridge strongly
advocates Delaware’s off-the-rack default statutory model of
corporate governance which protects the board’s authority
against direct shareholder influence in day-to-day decision
making. In fact, it has even been suggested that Bainbridge
advocates a more pro-board position than even Delaware
dares.117 He describes how Delaware’s corporate law protects the
primacy of the directors to govern the corporation, asserting that
this doctrinal position sits well with prevailing corporate
Bainbridge, Nexus of Contracts]; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director
Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV.
547 (2003) (revisiting director primacy, including: decision-making by fiat; the
primacy of the board of directors over shareholders and managers; the
relationship between the director primacy model and the nexus of contracts
model; and the importance of centralized decision-making for efficient
corporate governance by balancing the need for balancing authority and
accountability within corporate regulation).
116
For instance, read The Economist’s claim that directors are the lapdogs
of managers on the critical issue of executive compensation: “… many bosses
in other industries are overpaid because weak boards have allowed them to
dictate the terms of their compensation. As a result, pay bears little
relationship to performance and tends to rise inexorably. A chief critic of the
supposed corporate gravy-train is Warren Buffett. At the annual meeting of
his holding company, Berkshire Hathaway, on May 2nd the legendary investor
railed against a system that lets chief executives choose the members of
remuneration committees. This, he claimed, allows them to select compliant
directors prepared to wave through pay proposals. ‘These people aren’t
looking for Dobermans,’ he complained. ‘They’re looking for cocker
spaniels.’” Attacking the Corporate Gravy Train, THE ECONOMIST, May 28,
2009.
117
For more detail on this argument, see Brett H. McDonnell, Professor
Bainbridge and the Arrowian Moment: A Review of The New Corporate
Governance in Theory and Practice, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 139 (2009).
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theory.118 In particular, he contends that Delaware’s director
primacy fits nicely with the contractarian concept of the firm.119
Bainbridge explains that decision making by fiat, which the
board represents, is where the nexus of contracts meet and where
the decision making power about how to manage this nexus is
most efficiently allocated.120
Bainbridge explains that there will always be a need to
balance the authority and accountability of directors, but the
complexities and demands of managing this nexus suggest that
careful consideration must be taken before limiting the authority
of the board.121 He warns that there is a great danger that limiting
board authority will stifle the corporation’s ability to innovate.122
Bainbridge offers a number of arguments for broad directorial
discretion,123 possibly providing his best defense of Delaware’s
allocation of authority to directors (which may be at the expense
of greater shareholder empowerment). However, if what he
contends is true, this broad discretion is ultimately in the
shareholder’s best interest.
Although Bainbridge argues that corporate boards do (and
should) have final authority over decision making, his arguments
also align with the shareholder primacy position: that such
decision making authority must be for the sole benefit of
shareholders. He justifies this position normatively by using the
dubious majoritarian default model. This model suggests that the
shareholder wealth maximization norm is what all stakeholders
of the firm ultimately want because default rules that pander to
management are inefficient – increasing the cost of capital,
creating greater vulnerability to hostile takeover, and negatively
affecting the overall health of the corporation. The distinction
that Bainbridge makes between director primacy and shareholder
primacy is that the advocates of shareholder primacy extend their
backing of shareholder power beyond the shareholder wealth
maximization norm by pushing for shareholders to have more
direct control over the day-to-day affairs of the firm. Director
primacy advocates argue only the shareholder wealth
118

BAINBRIDGE, supra note 64, at IX–XII.
See Bainbridge, Nexus of Contracts, supra note 115.
120
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 64, at 32–35.
121
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention
Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83 (2004).
122
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 64, at 124–26.
123
For more details read Bainbridge’s relevant arguments, see
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 64, at 45-75.
119
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maximization norm.
Putting the collective action problems of a widely
dispersed shareholder class aside, Bainbridge suggests that
directors, who are motivated primarily by the shareholder wealth
maximization norm, will more vigilantly care for the firm’s
wellbeing for the benefit of shareholders than direct shareholder
empowerment.124 One reason for this is the ease with which
shareholders can exit the firm. Such unattached shareholder
influence can shift the firm’s focus to short-term, ill-informed,
and/or self-serving goals that can possibly corrupt prudent
corporate strategy over the long-term. Another reason for
endorsing director primacy is that such direct shareholder
empowerment would serve only to endorse the special interests of
those who have power within the shareholder class: institutional
investors.
Bainbridge justifies why authority ought to rest with the
board of directors within the corporate governance structure by
arguing that a governance group (that acts collegially) is superior
to a single autocrat at the apex of the corporate governance
hierarchy.125 In making this argument, he offers evidence from
the behavioral economics literature which explains why group
decision making is of higher quality than individual decision
making.126 This leads Bainbridge to conclude that corporate
boards are more effective at monitoring corporate governance
than a single autocrat, and thus the fiat model is generally the
best option.127
The main problem with the fiat model remains: who
watches the watchers? In other words, who keeps the board of
directors from being poisoned by groupthink and/or other forms
of collective action failure? And who keeps the board of directors
from social loafing and/or other serious opportunistic behavior?
Bainbridge’s answer is the board itself.128 The arguments
justifying this answer are at best hopeful. The optimism of his
124

Id. at 55-57.
Id. at 78-79.
126
For more details read Bainbridge’s relevant arguments, see id. at 82104; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in
Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2002) (exploring why the default
statutory model of corporate governance promotes a governance group that
acts collegially, using evidence from the behavioral sciences to help explain
why group decision-making is generally superior to individual decisionmaking).
127
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 64, at 104.
128
Id. at 75-78.
125

Stewart Article.doc (Do Not Delete)

170

Loyola Consumer Law Review

12/29/2010 1:10:04 PM

[Vol. 23:2

answer may make some hardened anti-managerialists smile
cruelly at the lack of realism that one must embrace to wholeheartedly be at ease with the potential of directors selfmonitoring.
To be fair, this is a serious problem with no easy answer;
and to his credit, Bainbridge attacks it directly. Ultimately,
though, his arguments are more sound regarding the avoidance of
collective action failure than they are regarding the avoidance of
opportunistic behavior. Albeit, the group dynamic makes
opportunism less attractive for one individual within the group
than it would for an all-powerful autocrat with no equals. That
said, the suggestion that social norms (like reputational cost and
the virtues of the communal life within the boardroom) will
prevent the board from acts of opportunism at the expense of all
other constituents of the firm may be too sweet for some intimate
observers of director politics to swallow.
Bainbridge suggests that a key problem for corporate
governance is locating the appropriate balance between
providing enough authority for the board to govern the firm in an
efficient manner, while not providing so much discretion that
authority becomes unreviewable, uncorrectable, and ultimately
unaccountable.129 Therefore, at one extreme, efficiency demands
that board decisions are shielded from shareholders and courts;
otherwise, optimal risk-taking will be discouraged and the
internal team governance structure could be seriously
compromised by the fear of hindsight review.
What about the courts protecting shareholders from
extensive director discretion? Bainbridge reasons that
shareholders are protected from “optimal” risk-taking by the
dual functioning of limited liability and portfolio diversity.130 At
the other extreme, if directors flagrantly violate their obligation to
maximize shareholder wealth, the threat of judicial accountability
must come out as a deterrent for corporate irresponsibility.
However, this is not an easy balance to strike. Bainbridge warns
that judges must use caution because they are not business
experts, and because hindsight can make decision making look
more irresponsible when the consequences of those decisions are
known to have been negatively magnified.
In determining the balance to be struck between authority
and accountability, Bainbridge sides with the Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co. case, which provides a conservative
129
130

Id. at 153.
Id. at 115.
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interpretation of the application of the business judgment rule.131
The Unocal interpretation views the business judgment rule
through the lens of the doctrine of abstention. This interpretation
suggests that the business judgment rule allows the courts to go
no further than to assess whether a board was disinterested and
independent in their decision-making process (good faith) and
that the decision-making process was reasonable (sans gross
negligence).132 Thus, Bainbridge endorses a presumption in favor
of strong judicial deference to board decisions as long as there is
some evidence of good faith and competence. He ultimately
justifies this position by reasoning that directors cannot be made
more accountable without compromising their authority, leading
to less-than-optimal risk-taking.133
The key to director primacy, therefore, is establishing that
directors are becoming agents of change by: 1) severing their
more or less exclusive loyalty to “managers;” 2) championing
the rights of all shareholders; and 3) forging further corporate
governance. It is here that director primacy either lives or dies by
the sword, for when Bainbridge attacks managerialism as
inadequate he is indirectly challenged to establish how the
distinction drawn between managerialism and his director
primacy is in fact defensible.
Before Bainbridge, most traditional managerialists
assumed that their readers understood that directors were
included in the term “managers” because no clear distinction
between the decision making outcomes of directors and senior
executives was thought to exist. One major reason for this predetermination was that the CEO was generally the office where
actual power consolidated in public corporations. In practice, the
CEO had tremendous control over: 1) who would be on the ballot
for board elections; and 2) the flow of information from corporate
operations to the board. Many times, the CEO was on the board
(if not the chairman of the board), making frank discussions
about managerial performance during board meetings difficult at
best. Thus, the CEO accumulated a great deal of power to
manage the corporation. So much that if there was one individual
that Bainbridge had in mind in his comparison between group
decision making and individual decision making, the CEO would
131

Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 947 (Del. 1985).
For full analysis of the Unocal test, see BAINBRIDGE, supra note 64, at
137-40.
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Id. at 153.
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likely be that individual as he or she has historically been the
corporation’s best approximation of the single autocrat at the
apex of the corporate governance hierarchy. In fact, it is not
always clear how much the influence of the CEO has changed in
the day-to-day function of the corporation.
When Bainbridge looks to the future of corporate
governance in America, he sees two competing models:
shareholder primacy and director primacy.134 He petitions for
greater vigilance in the face of today’s pressure to extend the
shareholder franchise.135 Bainbridge notes that, although
shareholders are the sole beneficiaries of corporate governance
and although directors have a duty to enforce shareholder wealth
maximization, there is very good reason why shareholder power
is so limited.136 He argues that shareholder primacy is a flawed
account of American corporate governance and, accordingly, in
appreciating the reasons for this, director primacy emerges from
the cries that proclaim greater shareholder primacy is the
enlightened path for corporate governance.137
Bainbridge contends that no shareholder empowerment
amendments are needed in order to ensure that the American
corporate governance model optimizes shareholder protection.138
134
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director v. Shareholder Primacy in the
Convergence Debate, 16 TRANSNAT'L LAW 45 (2002).
135
Id. (Clarifying that most scholars in the convergence debate assume
that American corporate law primarily promotes shareholder primacy, when it
actually promotes director primacy, warning that such confusion may have
serious consequences when transplanting the American model into recipient
jurisdictions); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Shareholder Activism and
Institutional Investors, UCLA Sch. of L., Law-Econ Research Paper No. 0520 (Sept. 2005) available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=796227 (warning
of the dangers of greater institutional investor activism, arguing that such
investors are motivated by narrow interests that may undermine passive
investors and compromise the effectiveness of the board to make decisions in
the best interest of the firm); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited
Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601 (2006) (petitioning for
greater prudence before extending the shareholder franchise, defending why
only shareholders have voting rights and then defending why such voting
rights are so limited); See Bainbridge 2006, supra note 105 (responding to
Lucian A. Bebchuk's article entitled: The Case for Increasing Shareholder
Power, rejecting Bebchuk’s proposals for allowing shareholders to have
greater voting power so that they can change a firm’s basic corporate
governance arrangements, defending existing regime of limited shareholder
voting rights).
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He argues that director primacy satisfies this objective by
ensuring that corporate governance abides by the shareholder
wealth maximization norm.139 He warns that shareholder primacy
urges policy-makers to grant shareholders additional powers to
exercise direct control over the corporation, but this will prove to
be detrimental to the shareholder class as a whole.140 This is
because special interests (institutional investors), which have
consolidated power within the shareholder class, will exploit
these additional powers at the expense of weaker shareholders.141
Within the existing corporate governance order,
Bainbridge suggests that shareholders are happy to be rationally
apathetic because it is easier to exit than it is to fight.142 He
contends that this is true even for institutional investors because
of: 1) the costs of monitoring corporate activities and engaging in
activism; 2) the frequency of free riding on such efforts; and 3) the
marginal gains that result from such activism.143 Bainbridge
asserts that the apathy of shareholders is normally a good thing
because when institutional investors are motivated to interfere
with corporate governance, they usually do so in order to
champion their narrow interests which undermine shareholders’
interests as a whole and hamper the ability of directors to make
decisions in the best interest of the firm.144
There are a number of existing vehicles for shareholder
activism including: 1) exit; 2) proxy contests; 3) withholding votes
in director elections; 4) shareholder proposals; and 5) private
negotiations between institutional investors and corporate
management. Bainbridge asserts that shareholder primacy
advocates view these vehicles as inadequate and that they
promote expansion of the shareholder franchise by: 1) reforming
the director nomination process; 2) reforming the mechanics of
the voting process; and 3) expanding the substance of what
shareholders can vote upon.145 Bainbridge flatly rejects that the
expansion of shareholder voting rights would be prudent,
reinforcing his main argument which calls for adherence to the
status quo. Ultimately, he reminds his reader that one should not
take lightly the dangers of interfering with board authority for
139
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the sake of greater accountability because “the preservation of
managerial discretion should always be [the] default
presumption.”146
The biggest test for the canonization of director primacy is
whether it is simply a semantic technique to maintain the defense
of the professional bureaucracy that runs the corporation or
whether the function of the board can be established as changing.
If the behavior of “managers” (excluding directors) is what
shareholder primacy advocates are up in arms about, and if
directors are really the true champions of the whole of the
shareholder class, then director primacy might be the “Third
Way” of corporate governance. However, if the distinction
between managerialism and director primacy cannot stand the
test of the Devil’s Advocate, and directors cannot be established
to be different than “managers,” this theory will fail to be
convincing as a new path for corporate governance.
For this reason, the stakes are at their highest when
Bainbridge makes the case for the distinction between directors
and managers in the post-Enron function of the American board
of directors. Although Bainbridge argues that director
empowerment started much earlier than the enactment of SOX147
and other amendments to the listing requirements of various
American stock exchanges, his position is that these legal changes
have finally tipped the scales as directors are now starting to
enjoy enough freedom from executive officers to be able to
independently exercise authority over the corporation.148
Bainbridge’s narrative of the shift from managerialism to
director primacy is persuasive to read. He discusses the director’s
evolving role from being the rubber stamps of CEOs to
potentially having a legitimate monitoring function.149 He
explains how starting in the 1970s, the pressure mounted to
improve what was seen at that time as the board’s failure to rein
in the excesses of executive officers and improve management’s
performance.150 From this arose the recognition of the important
role that independent directors could play within the corporate
governance structure. He explains how post-Enron developments
146
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have bolstered a director’s ability to police managers for
shareholders by: 1) improving best-practice norms; 2)
strengthening the threats to a director’s reputation for turning a
blind eye to managers running roughshod over shareholder
interests; 3) increasing judicial pressure for better information
flow from management to directors; and 4) increasing
requirements for more independent directors on boards.151
Bainbridge’s argument is weaker when he fails to provide
strong empirical evidence that these changes are creating
“strong, active independent directors with little tolerance for
negligence or culpable conduct.”152 Again, there is little
empirical evidence to support his claims that this functional shift
is, in fact, occurring.153 In the end, Bainbridge sounds like E.
Merrick Dodd, Jr. who, in his reply to Adolf A. Berle, Jr., merely
employed optimism for the new generation of managers.154 They
are both very optimistic about the potential of a bureaucratic
revolution, an event which would transform the ruling fiats of the
great American corporations into group decision making centers
and, thereby, helping manage the economy in a manner that is
more beneficial to society.155 Both arguments are inspiring, but
also lack substance and amount to no more than corporate
futurism.
In the end, even in his best argument for director primacy
to date, Bainbridge makes quite a weak statement arguing that
the “real world practice” of directors is still “supine,” but is
“closer to the director primacy model than it was in earlier
periods.”156 One must respect Bainbridge’s candor on this point
but it does lay bare what might be the dangerously un-secret
weakness of the otherwise invulnerable Siegfried-like
argument.157
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VII. Reflections on the Battle for Delaware: Form or Substance?
Strine was obviously opposed to more federal meddling
within Delaware’s national corporate law regime and Bainbridge
was clearly a defender of the Delaware status quo. But by
encouraging greater federalization of corporate law, Bebchuk
appeared willing to risk Delaware’s caucus and the American
corporate law status quo in order to gain greater shareholder
engagement. Although Bebchuk did not appear to want to open
the Delaware arrangement to the flood of other interests that
might follow the federal government into the internal affairs of
the corporation, he was willing to risk it.
In The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, Bebchuk
used empirical evidence to establish that the power between
directors and shareholders of larger American corporations with
dispersed ownership was too unbalanced, as it blocked
shareholders from maximizing shareholder value when
management refused to cooperate.158 Bebchuk argued that
allowing shareholders to be directly involved in corporate
decision making would enhance corporate governance by
motivating management to be more cooperative because
shareholders had the power to directly intervene. With respect to
the reformation process, Bebchuk predictably stated that it
should be through federal intervention.159
Bebchuk’s writing indicated that he did not want to open
the floodgates beyond shareholders and managers to other
interests that influenced the federal government.160 If he did not
want these populous interests to start meddling in the internal
affairs of the corporation, what was he doing? Doubtless, he was
familiar with Roe’s position on the matter, so maybe he: 1) did
not believe that his petition for federal involvement seriously
threatened the Delaware caucus; 2) did not care if the Delaware
caucus was threatened (if managers monopolized it); or 3) maybe
he was using the Cary card as leverage to up the stakes and,
perhaps, make Delaware concede without federal intervention.
Regardless, the Cary card caused different reactions which were
interesting to observe. In response to Bebchuk’s proposal, Strine
suggested that the traditionalist investor would prefer the status
quo to what Bebchuk proposed.161 This was because the
158
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traditionalist investor would fear that Bebchuk’s proposal might
subvert their interests by compromising managerial authority.162
If managerial authority was undermined, institutional
intermediaries with no interests to serve but their own would
further compromise the corporate governance structure. Strine
suggested that the traditionalist investor would thus “leave
things where they [stood] even if the status quo [was] not
ideal.”163 But Strine still entertained Bebchuk’s proposal (with
some slight reframing) in order to be “open-minded” to the
idea that the traditionalist investor “might embrace reform that
[was] consistent with Bebchuk’s call for greater managerial
accountability.”164 Strine bit Bebchuk’s bait, but why? The
answer came when Strine asserted: “Therefore, if reform
attractive to the traditionalist is to come, it must emanate from
state policymakers who can implement a reform that coheres
with an overall approach to corporate law.”165 Strine
longwindedly made this argument but he reinforced his key
point: whatever amendments needed to be made, Delaware and
not the federal government needed to make them.166
Strine offered hope to Bebchuk that there might be
flexibility on the issue of shareholder empowerment but
Delaware needed to be the innovator, not the federal government,
because state competition must be preserved. It made sense that,
if the choice was between Delaware (form) and the status quo
(substance), Strine would advocate sacrificing some substance
and managerial power and protect Delaware’s de facto
preeminence. If this situation was to arise it would be ideal for
Bebchuk because it would maintain Delaware’s influence while
increasing shareholder influence within the political caucus.
As one might expect, Bainbridge opposed Bebchuk’s
proposal by employing the race-to-the-top argument.167 He
argued that existing corporate law was optimal because it
survived the competitive forces of the charter market.168 He then
made his director primacy argument defending why this model
was the appropriate model to protect shareholder interests.169 He
concluded that, since director primacy was the superior model
162
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and since Delaware’s default rules already enshrined director
primacy, no reform was necessary.170 The bottom line was that
Bainbridge rejected any changes to the form or the substance of
Delaware’s law and lawmaking capacity.
In sum, within the battle over corporate governance, there
appears to be an impasse which allows managers to have the
luxury of a heavy hand in shaping its evolution. Bebchuk,
champion of the shareholder and, to a lesser degree, of Cary, is
unhappy with this state of affairs and is petitioning federal
intervention to shake things up. Strine, champion of Winter and,
to a lesser degree, managerialism, is happy with Delaware’s
position as the manufacturer of “national” corporate law but
appears willing to negotiate with Bebchuk’s position. And
Bainbridge is the warrior of the Delaware status quo and is
deeply entrenched in his position. Or is he? For, although he
initially attacked creeping federalism, he now uses the provision
of SOX and the amendments to listing requirements to support
his director primacy argument.171 This might suggest that his
race-to-the-top argument gives way at times to pragmatism, as
does Strine’s defense of the Delaware status quo.
VIII. Conclusions
The power to influence the development of the corporate
charter within the Delaware caucus is the power to potentially
influence Granovetter’s actual and ongoing social networks
inside and outside of the corporation and, hence, underscore its
embeddedness. The above narrative highlights the levels of
contention between managers and shareholders for control over
future reforms. To date, managers have dominated the caucus
marginalizing efforts by shareholder advocates who want other
shareholders to have greater direct participation within
America’s corporate governance structures. Historically, the
Delaware caucus has weathered tremendous economic
transformations remaining relatively unchanged when compared
to the reforms Britain and Australia took over the last twentyfive years.172 Delaware has been less prone to amendment partly
because its corporate law regime is regarded to be the result of an
170
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innovative and inspirational regulatory lab which harnesses the
power of state competition.173
With a view to the still-open questions regarding state
competition, Bebchuk petitioned for more federal intervention,
challenging whether the market for charters inspires the optimal
lawmaking which is claimed to exist. He called for greater powersharing between the federal and state governments in this
process, hoping this would crack open the Delaware caucus and
result in more direct shareholder influence over corporate
decision making. In response to Bebchuk, Vice Chancellor Strine
argued that greater power-sharing with the federal government
would be a mistake because Delaware’s regulatory machinery
was not influenced by managers to a degree that would prevent
greater shareholder participation within corporate governance (if
such reforms were what shareholders really wanted and what
American corporate governance really needed). Meanwhile, this
dialogue between two highly regarded and influential discourse
participants – the Vice Chancellor of Delaware’s Court of
Chancery and America’s top legal academic advocate of
shareholder empowerment – has been unsettling to the avid
champions of Delaware’s present status quo.
Confidence in Delaware, like that heralded by Professor
Bainbridge, has made American corporate observers less likely to
look beyond national borders for inspiration in corporate reforms
and also less likely to assume that such reforms are necessary.174
In this way, the charter competition argument has been very
successful at maintaining a status quo in which corporate
managers have greater control over corporate governance policy
than similar managers have in either Britain or Australia –
countries that have both seen an increase in the participatory
rights of shareholders.175 However, American corporate
governance can be said to be in transition as there has clearly
been a shift of power away from the Delaware caucus in response
to its “modest and incremental” approach to reform.176 Starting
with the post-scandal regulatory responses (such as SOX), the
federal government has been more willing to interfere with the
presumed preeminence of the charter market.177 This may prove
to be the harbinger of the demise of the monopoly which
173
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Delaware has enjoyed for the past century,178 providing new
opportunities to increase the participatory rights of shareholders.
Today, corporate managers are under attack for having
failed to provide for adequate monitoring and oversight of their
firms’ investments before the Credit Crisis. The situation has
called into question the balance between managerial authority
and managerial accountability. Eyes are on the capacity of state
level legal mechanisms (in particular Delaware) to deal with these
corporate governance failures.179 Meanwhile, federal reforms
(such as “say on pay” and other shareholder empowerment
initiatives) have either been established,180 or are in the works.181
Such federal interventions demonstrate a continued willingness to
intercede in corporate regulatory development at the state level.
It is difficult to foretell the long-term impact of such
federal interventions in the area of corporate governance. If this
attitude prevailed, the federal government would likely face
increased pressures from a number of interest groups – not just
shareholder groups – pushing for further corporate governance
reform. But is this a Pandora’s Box in the making? Alternatively,
Delaware may want to answer to the sort of pressures that
prompted the federal government’s activity in the first place. It
seems that, either way, more shareholder participation rights in
American corporate governance is a likely outcome.
The likelihood of such an outcome brings this argument
full circle. As noted in the beginning, the British corporate
governance expert Simon Deakin observed how Polanyi’s double
movement had in recent times been off-set to favor market
interests to the detriment of society, driven predominantly by the
power exercised by investors in this era of financialization. Now,
with the regulatory responses against the crisis still forthcoming,
one of the questions arising out of the foregoing is whether
increases in shareholder participatory rights are likely to further
increase the movement toward the financialization of the firm in
the American context? While only a few years ago we would have
found it hard to see how it would not, the current crisis and the
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emerging regulatory responses might suggest otherwise.182 This
uncertainty hints at the political stakes in the Delaware debate
and beyond.
Of course, the issue is more complex. Greater shareholder
participation may not be a bad thing. As Berle argued in response
to Dodd in the classical American debate over managerialism,
although shareholder empowerment may not be an adequate
solution to managerial opportunism, enforcement of property
rights is the only legal tool available to safeguard against it.183 But
how much has changed almost eighty years later? In 1932, Berle
was hopeful that new theories in sociology would soon provide
the support for legal innovations which would better regulate
corporate governance184 . . . the law is still waiting.
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